Why Brexit Will Do Little to Change the Political Contours of the European Social Dimension by Copeland, Paul
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 30–39
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i3.2126
Article
Why Brexit Will Do Little to Change the Political Contours of the European
Social Dimension
Paul Copeland
School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London, London, E1 4NS, UK;
E-Mail: p.copeland@qmul.ac.uk
Submitted: 28 March 2018 | Accepted: 15 June 2019 | Published: 16 September 2019
Abstract
Integration within the European social dimension, understood as the EU’s competence in the field of employment and
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1. Introduction
The European social dimension, understood as the EU’s
competence in the field of employment and social policy,
represents a patchwork of governance tools from differ-
ent ideological positions across the EU’s political space.
Comparing the EU’s competence in the European social
dimension to that of the Single European Market, it is
evident that the EU’s direct competence in the field is
relatively weak. However, the EU’s budgetary rules for
Members of the Eurozone in the form of the Stability and
Growth Pact place indirect pressures on the spending
of EU welfare states, thereby highlighting the complex-
ities posed in isolating and understanding policy areas
within the EU as discrete entities. Meanwhile, since the
late 1980s the political contours of the European social
dimension have shifted. During the late 1980s when the
idea of a European social dimension was first proposed,
it was guided and influenced by post-war Keynesian so-
cial democracy. While post-war European social democ-
racy accepted the logic of markets and capitalism, it be-
lieved that the state had a strong role to play in pro-
tecting individuals. This would involve, in part, the reg-
ulation of labour markets to prevent a competitive race
to the bottom of employment standards, as well as pro-
tecting individuals from the peaks and troughs of the
economic growth cycle. To varying degrees, post-war
Keynesian European states constructed welfare policies
thatwere designed to strike a balance between commod-
ifying and de-commodify individuals. Commodification is
to be understood as policies designed to make wages
from employment the linchpin of a person’s existence,
while de-commodification refers to policieswhich enable
individuals or families to uphold socially acceptable liv-
ing standards independent of the market and its peaks
and troughs (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, this vi-
sion of a European social dimension did not last and
by the mid-1990s post-war European social democracy
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both at the Member State and EU levels slowly shifted
to accommodate neoliberalism, which in turn, was to
guide the construction of the European social dimension.
There remains some disagreement between scholars of
the politics of the European social dimension. For exam-
ple, Caporaso and Tarrow (2009) argue that the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the na-
tional courts have progressively restructured the rules
concerning the freemovement of workers to incorporate
social policy concerns.While this nuancing of the treaties
and primary legislation is undeniably true, the process
of European integration and thereby the European so-
cial dimension are underpinned by neoliberalism. In a
similar logic, some scholars highlight various develop-
ments in the field as signalling the EU taking employ-
ment and social concerns more seriously (e.g., Zeitlin &
Vanhercke, 2017), but again the overall thrust of develop-
ments is towards neoliberal solutions to economic and
social problems.
This article analyses the UK’s political influence
within the European social dimension, as well as the
likely impact the UK’s departure from EU will have
on future integration. The analysis is guided by a his-
torical institutionalist analysis of European integration.
The core assumption of historical institutionalism is
that institutions—comprised of formal and informal
arrangements—matter, and of which the European so-
cial dimension is an example. While historical institution-
alism offers a detailed conceptual toolkit surrounding
the purpose, function and existence of institutions, this
article focuses on the concept of path-dependency. Path-
dependency argues that the policy choices made when
an institution is being formed, or policy is being initiated,
will have a continuing and largely determinate influence
over the policy far into the future (Peters, Pierre, & King,
2005). Once institutional architects make their initial pol-
icy and institutional choices, the patterns will persist un-
less there is some force sufficient to overcome the inertia
created during the inception of the programme (Peters
et al., 2005, p. 64). Inspired by this conceptual approach,
this article argues that the UK has been a ‘pivotal out-
lier’ (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019) in the European so-
cial dimension, first, by blocking the social democratic vi-
sion that emerged during the late 1980s and second, by
becoming supportive of a neoliberal vision for the field
throughout 1997–2010. Meanwhile, since 2010 neolib-
eralism has been consolidated within the European so-
cial dimension, while the UK has assumed a more outly-
ing position. This suggests that the political contours of
the European social dimension will not change once the
UK leaves the EU and that the political ideology of ne-
oliberalism transcends the influence ofWestminster and
has deep roots across the EU. Developments within the
European social dimension therefore have strong echoes
with other policy areas in two aspects. First, the influ-
ence of the UK shifting from having a central role in the
EU to one of a more outlying position in policy develop-
ments (see Roederer-Rynning & Matthews, 2019, in this
thematic issue); and second, Brexit will not make EU poli-
cies less neoliberal (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019; Price,
2019, in this thematic issue).
The second section of this article outlines the nature
of the European social dimension, the shifting political
contours of the field up until 2010, and the UK’s role in
their creation. The third section focuses on the likely non-
impact the UK’s departure from the EU will have on the
future of the European social dimension.
2. The Political Contours of the European Social
Dimension and the UK’s Role in Their Creation
2.1. The European Social Dimension in Context
Before explaining the nature of political contestation
around the European social dimension, we first need to
understand what it is. EU employment and social pol-
icy, commonly referred to as European social dimension,
is not a transnational welfare state that supersedes the
employment and social policies of the Member States.
Rather its purpose is to: regulate and coordinate those
policy areas related to the free movement of workers,
such as social security; harmonise policy areas which
may distort competition, such as health and safety at
work; provide for EU level social dialogue; and to provide
a framework within which the Member States should re-
form and modernize their welfare policies in the context
of contemporary economic and social challenges. To re-
alise these very specific competences and functions, the
EU uses a mixture of governance instruments such as
conventional directives and regulations, as well as legally
non-binding instruments such as the Open Method of
Coordination (OMC; Ter Haar & Copeland, 2010). Broadly
speaking, directives and regulations are used in policy ar-
eas that coordinate social security and those that aim
at preventing a distortion of competition. Gender equal-
ity also falls under the latter category, but over the last
three decades the EU has broadened its equality remit
by including all forms of anti-discrimination. In the ar-
eas of pension reform, employment, education and train-
ing, healthcare, wages, and poverty and social exclusion,
the EU predominantly utilizes the OMC. This governance
process sees the EU set benchmarks or targets, such as
the Lisbon Strategy target of an EU employment rate
of 70 per cent by 2010, and the Member States com-
mit themselves to undertake the necessary reforms to
achieve them. While this is a legally non-binding com-
mitment, governments are encouraged tomake progress
by annual reporting, peer review, and the issuing of
County Specific Recommendations from the Council and
the Commission in areas of policy weakness.
Similar to other EU policy areas, the European social
dimension suffers from an expectations–capability gap.
Eurostat data show that EU citizens are supportive of
the EU doing more in the field. Meanwhile, Daly (2007,
p. 2) describes integration in the field as ‘fitful’—that
is, periods in which intense amounts of political activ-
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ity are then followed by very little integration momen-
tum. Over the last three decades the politics and ideol-
ogy of the European social dimension has fundamentally
shifted. Following the signing of the Single European Act,
the concept of a social dimension was touted by then
President of France, FrançoisMitterrand, and takenupby
the then President of the European Commission, Jacques
Delors (Copeland, 2014, pp. 11–12). The idea was to pro-
vide a counterweight to neoliberal-driven economic in-
tegration and the free-market vision of Europe whereby
workers’ rights were enshrined in law and social bene-
fits were harmonized and provided on a Europe-wide ba-
sis. This vision was inspired by post war Keynesian so-
cial democracy and would serve to ensure that mem-
bers of the then European Economic Community (EEC)
would not gain a competitive advantage by liberalising
labour law and cutting levels of taxation (and thereby
welfare payments). However, from the mid-1990s on-
wards this vision was slowly replaced by one in which
the centre-left accommodated neoliberalism and the bal-
ancing of the neoliberal Single European Market with a
Keynesian European social dimension failed to take hold.
The fundamental purpose of the European social dimen-
sion is therefore to restructure and reform the post-war
Keynesian social democratic welfare state to ensure that
the welfare states of the EU’s Members are compatible
with the neoliberal logic of the Single European Market.
That logic being one in which taxes are cut; the role of
the state reduced; state assets privatised; a deregulation
of business and finance; a priority given to low inflation
rather than low unemployment; the opening up domes-
tic markets to international capital and trade; and an
increasingly important role within the economy for mi-
grant workers (Harvey, 2005). In the context of the wel-
fare state this represents a shift in purpose from one in
which citizens are protected from the market via poli-
cies of de-commodification, to one in which the welfare
state supports and extends the reliance of individuals on
the market via policies that deepen processes of com-
modification. In an EU context, this manifests itself in
the shift from ‘passive benefits’, such as unconditional re-
ceipt of unemployment benefits, to active labour market
policies (ALMPs). ALMPS introduce welfare benefit con-
ditionality whereby the unemployed receive benefits on
the condition that they search for work or participate in
education and training, even if there are very few jobs
available. Meanwhile, the liberalization of labour mar-
ket regulation and a flexible employment regime serves
to encourage employers to hire workers. The rights of
ordinary workers are continuously reduced to remove
labour market ‘rigidities’ andmake labour behave, in the
words of Karl Polanyi (2001), as if it were a true commod-
ity attempting to find its natural price. The EU and its
Member States support individuals during this process,
but such support is conditional on a process of accepting
increased commodification of everyday life. The neolib-
eral welfare state is therefore one in which individuals
weather the peaks and troughs of the economic growth
cycle, while elected governments enable themarket, and
labour, to function correctly.
2.2. The Role of the UK
The signing of the Single EuropeanAct in 1986 represents
a significant turning point in the process of European in-
tegration, as it aimed to both deepen and widen the in-
tegration of the EEC (Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998; Nugent,
1999). The Act aimed to complete the InternalMarket for
physical goods with the removal of all barriers and tar-
iffs for trade, introduced some changes to the Brussels-
decision making processes, such as in introduction of
Qualified Majority Voting in the Council for some pol-
icy areas, as well as enhanced powers for the European
Parliament. The achievement of the Single European Act
was to be secured by the deregulation, liberalisation
and sometimes re-regulation of the European economy,
thereby representing a fundamental ideological shift of
the EEC away from post-war Keynesianism towards ne-
oliberalism. Meanwhile, the political momentum sur-
rounding the Act created a ‘spill over’ effect into pol-
icy areas beyond physical goods, such as telecommuni-
cations and air transport. However, the emergence and
eventual dominance of neoliberalism to guide the pro-
cess of European integration was by no means a given,
as throughout the 1980s and early 1990s there was po-
litical contestation surrounding how best to move for-
ward, as demonstrated by the vision put forward by
Jacques Delors.
The UK has played a crucial role in forging the po-
litical contours of the European social dimension and
thwarting a social dimension that counterbalanced the
Single EuropeanMarket. When PrimeMinister Margaret
Thatcher said in her 1988 Bruges speech ‘we have not
successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in
Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European
level with a European super-state’ (Thatcher, 1988)
she was reacting, not just to what she regarded as
creeping EU federalism, but also to the policies of the
European Community such as those that aimed to cre-
ate a European social dimension as a counterweight to
the Single European Market. In 1989 the governments
of the Member States, with the exception of the UK,
adopted the Community Charter of Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers, heralded as the European social di-
mension equivalent of the Single European Act. At the
Maastricht Treaty Negotiations, the Community Charter
was given full legal recognition, but continued opposi-
tion from the UK resulted in the Charter being annexed
to the Treaty, thereby permitting integration in the field
without the UK. The Social Chapter, as it was known at
Maastricht, included policy areas such as the promotion
of employment, proper social protection, social dialogue,
and the combating of poverty and social exclusion.
The UK’s reluctance to integrate in the field clearly
put a break on the emergence of a more social
democratic-inspired European social dimension (Velluti,
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2010, p. 114). The UK thwarted the political momen-
tum and ensured that policy issues remained on themar-
gins of the integration process. Without one of the EU’s
largest Member States involved in the process of inte-
gration, there were concerns that the UK may gain a
competitive advantage within the EU should the other
11 Member States agree policy that would impose re-
strictions and extra costs on labour. However, this did
not mean that the UK was exempt from all policy devel-
opments in the field. From the late 1980s onwards the
EEC/EU agreed a series of directives in the field of health
and safety atwork, an EUpolicy competence that falls un-
der the Treaty provisions of the Single European Market
and not the European social dimension. The adoption
of the Single European Act brought health and safety
at work into the Treaty for the first time and policy is
agreed by qualified majority voting. Despite the UK sign-
ing the Single European Act, it did not take long for oppo-
sition to mount in Westminster against the policy com-
petence. One such health and safety directive, the 1993
Working Time Directive (WTD) proved a step too far for
the government of John Major (1990–1997). The direc-
tive limits the number of working hours an individual can
work to 48 per week (averaged over a three-month ref-
erence period), as well as provisions for holiday entitle-
ment and rest periods. The original justification for the
directive had been that working time was a health and
safety issue and that working excessive hours over a pro-
longed period was detrimental to health. The Major gov-
ernment argued that it was an employee’s fundamental
right to choose the amount of hours worked and that the
WTD would reduce the flexibility of the UK’s labour mar-
ket. The directive therefore included the opt-out clause
which permitsMember States not to apply themaximum
48-hour limit on the basis of voluntary agreement be-
tween employers and employees. Despite the opt-out,
the UK government remained disgruntled, prompting it
to challenge the legal basis of theWTD in the ECJ. The UK
government argued that the directive was not a health
and safety directive, which permitted decisions to be
taken in the Council by qualified majority voting and
thereby overruling a British veto during unanimity voting
(Blair & Leopoid, 2001). This view was not shared by the
ECJ which in 1996 ruled that the WTD was a health and
safety issue and that theUKwas required to implement it.
A reluctant Labour Government implemented the direc-
tive in 1998, although it decided to use the opt-out for all
sectors of the economy. Despite opting out of the social
dimension, the UK therefore still found itself embroiled
in negotiations surrounding health and safety legislation.
While the political agency of the UK thwarted efforts
to move forward with a Keynesian-inspired European so-
cial dimension, it is important to understand how this
agency interacted with the institutional context within
which it was situated. Scharpf (1999, 2006) has argued
that the institutional architecture of the EU combined
with the political, economic and institutional heterogene-
ity of the Member States creates a structural asymmetry
between the policies of liberalisation and those of social
regulation. Central to this observation is Scharpf’s distinc-
tion between negative and positive integration. Negative
integration describes the elimination of tariffs, barriers
to trade, and distortions to free competition such as state
aid—it is almost always market-creating. It is driven by
the ECJ based on the four freedoms (goods, services,
capital, people) as well decisions taken by the European
Commission in competition law. By contrast positive in-
tegration is understood as the exercise of economic
and regulative competences at the supranational level
and can either be market-making or market-correcting.
Positive integration is a political decision-making mode
that requires a broad consensus among national gov-
ernments and the European Parliament (Scharpf, 1999,
pp. 50–51). Given that such a broad consensus is dif-
ficult to obtain under qualified majority voting, espe-
cially in a diverse union of Member States with differ-
ent production regimes, political comprises often only
represent the ‘lowest common denominator’ (Höpner,
2013, pp. 75–76; Scharpf, 2006, p. 851; Seikel, 2016,
p. 1402). In short, market-correcting policies, including
those in the European social dimension, are unlikely to
emerge from Brussel and those that are proposed are
most likely to be watered down to becomemore market-
making. The political agency of the UK combined with in-
stitutional and political configuration of the EU thwart
a Keynesian-inspired European social dimension and en-
abled the creation of one that is broadly underpinned
by neoliberalism.
1997 represents a step-change for the European so-
cial dimension in two ways. First, the 1997 general elec-
tion brought the Labour Party, under Tony Blair, to power
in the UK. In its election manifesto it promised to be
a more constructive partner in the EU than its prede-
cessors and it signed the UK into the Social Chapter
(Barnard, 1997). This move paved the way for the Social
Chapter to be fully incorporated into the main body of
the Treaty at the Amsterdam Treaty changes (1997). It
was greeted with great optimism in the other European
capitals and was thought to signify a turning point not
just in UK–EU relations, but for the European social di-
mension as well. Second, the Treaty changes agreed at
Amsterdam shifted the governance tools used within
the European social dimension. Amsterdam marks the
move away from directives with their harmonizing ef-
fect, to the legally non-binding forms of governance,
known as the OMC from 2000 onwards. The European
Employment Strategy, launched in 1997, was in part, in-
fluenced by the 1995 EU accession of Austria, Finland
and Sweden—three Member States that have some of
the most generous welfare states on the Continent. The
use of this flexiblemodeof governancewas regarded as a
pragmatic solution to further integrate in the field which
is characterised by significant differences between the
Member States (Caune, Jacquot, & Palier, 2011).
While most of the literature on the European
Employment Strategy highlights its innovative form of
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‘new’ governance (Trubek&Mosher, 2003; Zeitlin, 2009),
it is equally important to recognise the politics of the
European Employment Strategy and the shift of think-
ing within the mainstream European left. The new left,
which emerged across Europe from the mid-1990s on-
wards, represents a radically different ideology to post-
war Keynesian social democracy, and is more compati-
ble with neoliberalism and the Single European Market.
The European left was therefore playing catch-up with
developments in the Single EuropeanMarket and sought
to bridge the divide between neoliberalism and post-
war social democracy. The ‘Third Way’ vision of politi-
cal economy, as it was known, embraced neoliberalism,
albeit to intervene to support economic and social fair-
ness by ensuring that individuals had the necessary op-
portunities and skills to participate in the market. In
this regard, the Third Way was about embracing the ne-
oliberal market while simultaneously reducing some of
the more extremes of purely commodified labour mar-
kets (cf. Giddens, 1998). For the European social dimen-
sion, this meant reforming the EU labour market to re-
move rigidities and to ensuremaximum flexibility so that
labour would behave as though it was any other com-
modity to be bought and sold.Meanwhile, the Keynesian
policy of individuals receiving unemployment benefit, re-
gardless of the economic situation, was to be replaced by
ALMPs whereby benefit recipients were to receive bene-
fits on the condition that they look for work or engage in
education and training programmes. Such policies shift
the burden of responsibility for the economic and social
situation away from the state and place this onto the indi-
vidual, regardless of the economic situation. From 1997
onwards, the European social dimension slowly became
the EU’s transmission belt through which the post-war
Keynesianwelfare statewas to be reformed and replaced
with policies of neoliberalism. New Labour’s embracing
of the European social dimension was therefore an em-
bracing of a policy area that had a near perfect fit with
its own domestic political agenda—the UK opted-in to
the European social dimension because it would not con-
strain domestic policy (Hopkin & van Wijnbergen, 2011).
The launching of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000 built on
the optimism and ideology of the European Employment
Strategy. Lisbon was the EU’s economic and social re-
formprogramme for the decade and aimed tomodernise
the structural pillars of the European economy to be-
come: ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth with more and better jobs and greater so-
cial cohesion’ (European Council, 2000). In the European
social dimension this involved reforms and the mod-
ernisation of pensions, employment protection, employ-
ment policies, education and training systems, and im-
provements to fields such as gender equality and social
exclusion. Inspired by the governance processes used
within the European Employment Strategy, these policy
areas were also to use the now referred to OMC. The
Lisbon Agenda further emphasised the centre-left’s vi-
sion for a European social dimension, which continued
to shift the political contours of the debate from regu-
lation, harmonisation, and decommodification, to that
of de-regulation, flexibility and commodification, albeit
with state support. A lack of progress surrounding the
various targets of the Lisbon Agenda and the changing
political constellations of the EU resulted in the need
to relaunch the strategy in 2005. The incoming Barroso
Commission (2004–2009) commissioned a report by the
former Dutch Prime Minister, Wim Kok, to review the
Agenda. The report argued that the Lisbon Agenda was
failing tomake progress because of policy overload, poor
coordination, conflicting priorities, and weak national
ownership. With the centre-right now in a majority in
the European Council (14 of 25 states) key heads of
government (Tony Blair of the UK, Silvio Berlusconi of
Italy, Jean Claude Juncker of Luxembourg) in conjunction
with the Commission, formed alliances to radically re-
form the Lisbon Agenda (James, 2012, pp. 18–20). The
Lisbon Strategy or Lisbon II as it was sometimes referred
to, simplified its aim to improve ‘Growth and Jobs’, and
limited the number of objectives and governance struc-
ture (Ter Haar & Copeland, 2010, pp. 287–288). Lisbon II
signifies the end of the centre-left experimentation with
the European social dimension and shifted the reform
agenda to a much deeper process of commodification.
Under Lisbon II social cohesion became a simple func-
tion of, and dependent upon, progress made within the
economy and the policy areas of employment and ed-
ucation were coupled and integrated with the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines to improve the synergies
and linkages between macroeconomic policy and the re-
form of certain aspects of the welfare state. Meanwhile,
the policy areas of social inclusion, healthcare, and pen-
sions were relegated in importance and were side-lined
(Tholoniat, 2010).
Against this backdrop the number of Directives pro-
posed for the European social dimension stalled. One of
the most high-profile fallouts was that of the revision of
the WTD. Within the original directive a review clause
was included requiring the opt-out and the reference pe-
riod to be reviewed before 2003, by which point it was
hoped that the UK would have reduced its long hours
working culture and that the opt-out could be removed.
Furthermore, two ECJ rulings (SiMAP and Jaeger) had
questioned whether the inactive part of on-call time was
to be considered asworking time. The ECJ concluded that
all on-call time was to be considered as working time,
however, the majority of EU Member States had already
interpreted the original Directive as stipulating that the
inactive part of on-call timewas notworking time. This is-
sue was therefore also part of the renegotiations of the
Directive. Following the release of a revised draft direc-
tive by the European Commission in 2004, the UK found
itself in a minority position within the Council regard-
ing the removal of the opt-out. However, over the fol-
lowing three years the diplomatic efforts of the UK re-
sulted in it and its new allies forming the majority posi-
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tion within the Council. The political negotiations took
numerous twists and turns, but it is estimated that the
UK dedicated no less than 200 civil servants to the task
of securing a revised Directive that included the opt-
out. Its position was bolstered by the 2004 enlargement
with 8 of the 10 newMember States having transitioned
from state-socialism to neoliberal capitalist democracy.
Furthermore, they were also keen to protect their com-
parative advantage of being a low-cost base for produc-
tion within the EU. With a stalemate in the European
Council, and between the Council and the European
Parliament, the latter who wanted to remove the opt-
out, a revised Directive was eventually shelved, the UK
having ensured thatmaximum flexibility within the direc-
tive was maintained (Copeland, 2014, pp. 79–87).
3. The Contours of a Post-Brexit European Social
Dimension
Since 2010 the EU has strengthened the neoliberal re-
form integration that emerged during the Lisbon decade
within the European social dimension, but importantly,
has done so without the participation of the UK. Since
2010 successive UK governments have strategically with-
drawn fromengagingwith the EU’s social dimension. This
stands in stark contrast to the New Labour Governments
(1997–2010) that aimed to shape and thereby deter-
mine EU policy in the European social dimension. This
strategic withdrawal was based on the position of the
Conservative Party, which formed various UK govern-
ments from2010 onwards. In its 2010 electionmanifesto
the Conservative Party, traditionally a Eurosceptic party,
argued that the ‘steady and unaccountable intrusion of
the European Union into almost every aspect of our lives
has gone too far’ (Conservative Party, 2010). It pledged
to return powers from the EU including the Charter
on Fundamental Rights, criminal justice law, and social
and employment legislation. This played into long held
Conservative Party belief that the purpose of the EU is to
serve as a free trade area and that political union, as well
as attempts to harmonise or coordinate policy outside of
the Single European Market, represent an infringement
upon national sovereignty. Failing to win an outright
majority in the 2010 election, the Conservative Party
formed a coalition government with the minority Liberal
Democrat party—historically a pro-EU party—in May of
that year. The Government appointed Iain Duncan Smith,
regarded as an ardent Eurosceptic in the Conservative
Party, as the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.
This corresponded with the final negotiations and prepa-
rations for the successor to the Lisbon Strategy, Europe
2020, which was agreed in the European Council in June
2010. Europe 2020 includes several quantitative targets
for the European social dimension: for employment the
objective is to increase the number of individuals in work
to 75 per cent (age 20–64); in education and training
Member States are required to reduce the school drop-
out rate to less than 10 per cent and to increase the
share of the population aged 30–34who have completed
tertiary education to at least 40 per cent; for poverty
and social exclusion the target is to reduce the num-
ber of poor people across the EU by 20 million. Note
that in the latter policy area this is the first quantita-
tive target in the field and on paper represents signifi-
cant progress, even though the EU’s legal competence
has remained unchanged. While the UK’s aim to repa-
triate powers from Brussels in the European social di-
mension ultimately failed, from 2010 onwards the UK
refused to set quantitative targets for employment and
social aspects of Europe 2020. As the UK retreated, the
Government of Prime Minster David Cameron argued
that the EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis was not its
concern and that EU governance arrangements should
focus on Eurozone Members (Copeland, 2016).
The EU attempted to resolve the Eurozone crisis
by pursuing austerity—a policy in which EU Member
States voluntarily deflate their economies and restore
competitiveness by reducing wages, increasing taxation,
liberalising labour markets, and slashing public spend-
ing by cutting national budgets (Blyth, 2013). The lat-
ter may result in a reduction in the size of the pub-
lic sector, cuts to education, healthcare, pensions, and
other welfare benefits. For Ladi and Graziano (2014) EU
driven austerity should be conceived as ‘fast forward
Europeanization’ (read neoliberalism) in which EU states
that had dragged their feet on domestic reforms dur-
ing the previous decade were required to undertake
shock therapy and rapidly reform their economies un-
der pure market conditions. To govern this agenda the
EU introduced the European Semester—an annual gov-
ernance cycle in which the performance of the Member
States with regard to the tightened rules of the Stability
and Growth Pact, which require more stringent bud-
getary discipline, are coupled with the policy objectives
of Europe 2020. This coupling is intended to bemore pro-
nounced than the governance arrangements of Lisbon II
and represents a significant change to EU policy coor-
dination with the overall emphasis being on budgetary
discipline and fiscal consolidation (see Armstrong, 2012).
Prior to the commencing of a Semester cycle, Eurozone
Members are required to submit their national budgets
for approval to the Commission in October before they
are finalised at national level. The Commission is then
able to assess the draft budgets in accordance with the
Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the Country Specific
Recommendations that were introduced in the previ-
ous year. The cycle of the European Semester begins in
November when the Commission publishes its Annual
Growth Survey and the Alert Mechanism Report. The for-
mer sets out the Commission’s economic and social pri-
orities for the next 12 months. Once these have been
agreed by the Spring Council,Member States report their
progress of the Europe 2020 guidelines in a National
Reform Programme. In areas of policy weakness, the
European Commission and the European Council for-
mulate Country Specific Recommendations for each of
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the Member States. The Post-2010 EU governance ar-
rangements blend neoliberalism with German-led or-
doliberalism and this blending has continued the path-
dependency of the political economy of European in-
tegration (Blyth, 2013). The main difference between
the two is that while neoliberalism proposes a mini-
mal statewithmarket-self regulation, ordoliberalism pro-
poses aminimal state that regulatesmarkets tomaximise
competition and to protect and defend liberty from the
emergence of monopolies. Ordoliberalism is therefore a
more rules-based system of market governance than the
laissez-faire of neoliberalism, but in terms of processes of
commodification, it is no different as they both prioritise
individual freedom, the dominance of the market, and
hyper commodification (Wilkinson, 2019).
In the context of the European social dimension,
Europe 2020 and the European Semester construct an
ideological straight-jacket in which employment and so-
cial policy reforms need to conform to themarket-driven
logic of European integration. With enhanced surveil-
lance and restrictions on government spending, as well
as a potential financial penalty should the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact be breached, governments are
unlikely to undertake ambitious social and employment
policy reforms that may be costly in the short run, but
provide long-term benefits, for fear of the repercussions.
Meanwhile, as levels of taxation (income and corpora-
tion tax) are a competitive space within the EU, the race
to the bottom between the Member States to attract
and maintain capital, combined with an ageing popula-
tion that is more costly to support, result in there being
fewer resources for employment and social policy. Faced
with these restraints, governments and the EU aim to en-
sure that there are as few people dependent on the wel-
fare state as possible, particularly of working age. This
is achieved by intensifying ALMPs and the commodifi-
cation of individuals to make labour more attractive to
hire. The belief here is that pure markets will improve ef-
ficiency and thereby economic growth, but the reality is
very different as it forces individuals to behave as though
they are void of emotions, to be bought or sold on the
market a kin to any other good for sale. This ignores some
of the key features that make us human beings.
The EU’s Youth Guarantee, launched in 2013, serves
as a classic example of such a policy and illustrates the
direction the EU has been travelling since UK political
agency has been in decline. The Youth Guarantee in-
volved the ring-fencing of €6.4 billion of the European
Social Fund (ESF) to tackle an EU youth unemployment
rate of 23.9 per cent (European Council, 2013). Under
the Youth Guarantee, individuals below the age of 25
who have been unemployed for four months since leav-
ing formal education should be provided with a job of-
fer, apprenticeship, traineeship of continued education.
The ESF provides partial funding for the scheme, while
the remainder is matched by the Member States. The
Youth Guarantee focuses on improving the supply of
labour, but the Member States that had the highest lev-
els of youth unemployment were experiencing a lack
of domestic demand in their economies, the latter hav-
ing been suppressed by EU-driven austerity. There will
still be insufficient employment opportunities once such
programmes finish with the result being that the unem-
ployed are simply churned around a system unable to
find jobs. Meanwhile, the excess supply of labour will re-
sult in a downward pressure on wages which may stim-
ulate employment in the long-term, but individuals will
ultimately suffer under a system of self-imposed hyper
competitiveness. Towards the end of the second Barroso
Commission (2009–2014), the European Semester was
producingmore Country Specific Recommendations that
related to the European social dimension. However, the
claim that this resulted in a ‘partial but progressive social-
ization of the European Semester’ (Zeitlin & Vanhercke,
2017) is conditional and contingent on policies that
deepen market forces and therefore the commodifica-
tion of individuals (Copeland & Daly, 2018). In other
words, the European social dimension has increased its
profile within the European Semester, but the trade-off
has been to produce policies that continue to correspond
with a neoliberal vision of the welfare state.
This path-dependency of integration has contin-
ued under the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). While
Juncker has been able to raise the profile of the European
social dimension, the content of policy outcomes re-
mains in accordance with the EU’s now path dependent
approach in the field, although one exception to this has
been the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive
(2018). While it is not possible to go into detail on this
issue here, it should be noted that the revised Directive
aims to close several loop-holes within the original direc-
tive (1996) whereby temporary workers from the East
are able to undercut the wages of local workers in the
West (see Picard & Pochet, 2018). However, beyond this
the political economy of the European social dimension
remains intact. For example, the European Commission’s
Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation (European
Commission, 2017) calls for a better distribution of the
benefits of globalisation, coupled with effective social
protection, to help people find a decent job and adapt
to change. ‘Effective social protection’ clearly refers to
ALMPs, meanwhile the purpose of social protection is
to ensure that people find work and remain employed.
There is nothing redistributive in terms of income nor
genuinely protective of workers within this approach. In
relative terms, the Juncker Commission has increased
the number of employment and social Country Specific
recommendations made within the European Semester,
but this has not fundamentally changed the political
contours of them (see Clauwaert, 2018). These devel-
opments have been guided by the ‘social investment’
paradigm, which gained traction during the final days of
the Barroso II Commission. In its purest form, social in-
vestment is about distinguishing betweenwelfare spend-
ing that enhances productive capacity, such as educa-
tion and training, and that which is passive and spent
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on consumption, such as pensions and spending on el-
derly care (Nolan, 2013). In an EU context this means
ensuring that welfare spending produces a ‘return on in-
vestment’. Social considerations are therefore, at best, a
secondary priority, if at all. The market-driven process
of reforming European welfare states also underpins the
Juncker Commission’s most significant achievement for
the European social dimension—the European Pillar of
Social Rights. With much fanfare the Pillar was launched
in November 2017 and is a declaration of social and
employment rights that aims to feed into the European
Semester. The declaration is legally non-binding and con-
tains 20 principles and rights that are grouped into three
themes: (1) equal opportunities and access to the labour
market; (2) fair working conditions; and (3) social protec-
tion and inclusion. The pillar represents an amalgama-
tion of social rights already guaranteed in the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, albeit up-
dated to: (1) reflect changes in the labourmarket; (2) the
existing employment and social policy competences and
activities of the EU; and (3) a few policy issues that at-
tempt to both define and steer the European social di-
mension within the European Semester. The Pillar con-
tains very few rights that are new and despite it covering
issues such as housing and homelessness, access to es-
sential services, and childcare and support for children,
the broader set of social rights are obtained via an in-
dividual’s participation in the labour market and hence
their commodification.
4. Conclusion
The UK has been a pivotal outlier in the construction
of the European social dimension, first, by limiting the
emergence of the post-war Keynesian social democratic
vision that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
and second, by becoming supportive of a neoliberal vi-
sion for the field throughout 1997–2010. The thwart-
ing of a social democratic European social dimension
has clearly been aided by the EU’s tendency towards
negative integration, but at the crucial moment when
it was being constructed, the UK proved itself to be
a formidable force to block developments. Meanwhile,
developments since 2010 when the EU further consoli-
dated neoliberalism within the social dimension, and UK
political agency was in decline, suggest that the politi-
cal contours of the European social dimension will not
change once the UK leaves the EU. The power of ne-
oliberal ideas, sometimes blended with German-led or-
doliberalism, to reform European welfare states there-
fore transcends the agency of the UK and will con-
tinue long after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. At
its very core, as well as encouraging the free move-
ment of workers, by guaranteeing rights and access to
the welfare state, the European social dimension is de-
signed to reform EU welfare states to ensure that the
market plays an ever greater role in determining out-
comes for policy problems. In this respect, the aim is
to ensure that there is limited room for policies to de-
commodify individuals, thereby making labour behave
as though it is just another component of the Single
European Market. Post Brexit, while there may be in-
creased political activity within the European social di-
mension, its path-dependent trajectory will ensure that
the field will not fundamentally alter. Meanwhile, the
pursuit of this agenda within the EU is undermining the
very integrity of the EU. The current rise of populism and
nationalism within the EU owes much to the EU’s neolib-
eral agenda that continuously promotes market-driven
solutions for economic and social problems (Eatwell &
Goodwin, 2018, pp. 177–223). Commodifying individu-
als to such an extreme level, as noted by Karl Polanyi
(2001), will produce a backlash, as neoliberalism aims to
de-humanise and thereby commodify emotionally intel-
ligent human beings. A problem is that the UK’s attempt
to leave the EU will not alter the political economy of
European integration.
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